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RESPONSE
RIGHTS AS TRUMPS OF WHAT?t
Joseph Blocher*
In the archetypal U.S. rights case, a litigant asks a court to block,
invalidate, or remedy a government action on the basis that it violates
a constitutional guarantee. The archetype emerges from three basic
characteristics of the U.S. constitutional system: the power of judicial
review, the state action requirement, and the enumeration of negative
(rather than positive) guarantees. In such a case, constitutional rights
are tied to certain kinds of government wrongs. But which wrongs?
And how can, or should, rights respond to them?
In his important Foreword, Rights As Trumps?, Professor Jamal
Greene explores "two competing frames [that] have emerged for adjudicating conflicts over rights." In the first, which corresponds with that
of rights as trumps, "rights are absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be limited." 2 In the second, which generally
corresponds with proportionality review, "rights are limited but for the
exceptional circumstances in which they are absolute." 3 Greene argues
that the first frame has been broadly employed by the Supreme Court
in recent decades, but that it "has special pathologies that ill prepare its
practitioners to referee the paradigmatic conflicts of a modern, pluralistic political order." 4
As Greene notes,5 generalizations about the rights-as-trumps frame
are hard to maintain because U.S. constitutional law itself is pluralistic
and diverse, even within the context of a single constitutional guarantee.
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The First Amendment is sometimes treated as trump-like - when the
Court perceives viewpoint discrimination, for example6 - and often is
not - as when the Court evaluates a restriction in a nonpublic forum.7
The Equal Protection Clause is sometimes treated as trump-like
when the Court perceives a racial classification motivated by animus" - and often is not - as when the Court evaluates a nonsuspect
classification. 9
The underlying question in U.S. constitutional law, then, is usually
not whether to embrace the rights-as-trumps frame, but when and why.
And it is here that Greene makes an especially subtle and important
contribution, by highlighting the ways in which reflexive resort to that
frame can lead to an absolutist, corrosive characterization of constitutional conflicts.
For example, "[b]ecause the rights-as-trumps frame cannot accommodate conflicts of rights, it forces us to deny that our opponents have
them."10 Such rights-versus-rights conflicts are exemplified in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission," the case with which
Greene opens his Foreword. 12 Precisely because the conflicting rights
and interests of the individuals are prominent on both sides in that case,
it does not neatly fit the government-focused archetype described
above - the State of Colorado is almost an intermediary. But in most
cases, even in our pluralistic political order, the government action will
usually be more central, raising a different kind of rights-versus-rights
conflict: between the rights of an individual rights-holder and what
3
Greene calls "a democratic people's first-order right to govern itself."1

The modest goal of this Response is to emphasize and extend that
aspect of Greene's contribution - not how rights-as-trumps function,
but what kinds of government action trigger them. I focus here on two
such triggers: first, "government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption,"14
and, second, narrow but exceptional situations where even a well-meaning

6 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 5oi
U.S. 56o, 577 (iggi) (Scalia,

J.,

concurring in the judgment) ('Where the government prohibits con-

duct precisely because of its communicative attributes, we hold the regulation unconstitutional.").
7 Regulations of speech in such nonpublic forums are acceptable so long as they are "reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal

Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 8o6 (1985).

8

Susannah W. Pollvogt, UnconstitutionalAnimus, 8i FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 888 (2012) ("The

Court has held on numerous occasions that where a law is based on such animus, it will not survive
even the most deferential level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.").

9

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (applying rational

basis review to laws discriminating against the intellectually disabled).
10 Greene, supra note o, at 34.
1
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
12 Greene, supra note i, at 30.
13 Id. at I28 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 127-28.
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government has simply gone too far. The latter, which are not central
to Greene's account, are defined not by government purpose but by the
burden they place on a rights-holder - where a court perceives that
burden to be a total deprivation of the right, it is more likely to bypass
scrutiny entirely and to invoke the rights-as-trumps frame.15 Put differently: just as proponents of the rights-as-trumps frame will sometimes
avoid having to deploy the trump by going to great lengths to deny that
a constitutional interest has been burdened, 16 they might also tack in
the other direction and attempt to justify trumps by characterizing the
burden as total.
Focusing on the triggers for trumps might seem like nothing more
than a way of restating the rules: since trumps are outcome-determinative
rules, to say that X triggers a rule is just to say that the rule prohibits
X.17 But that shift matters, because the application of a doctrinal rule
can too often cover an outcome-determinative "sleight of hand" that set
the rule in motion." By focusing more intently on the specific kinds of

government wrongs that tend to trigger rules - improper government
purpose, total deprivations of a constitutional entitlement, or something
else - we might better understand not only the jurisprudential preferences at play, but the underlying views of government. When courts
employ the rights-as-trumps frame, they are singling out particular
kinds of government wrongs. What kinds? And why?
The first Part of this Response argues that trumps can be triggered
not only by the pathological frames that Greene identifies, but also by
scenarios where particular laws - even if well-intentioned - go too far
in terms of the burdens they impose on rights-holders. Part II explores
how these twin frames (Greene's, and my minor addition) have been
deployed in Second Amendment litigation. And Part III takes the occasion of the recent grant of certiorari in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass'n v. City of New York' 9 to argue (consistent with Greene) that the
Court should avoid endorsing a broad pathological frame in Second
Amendment cases, and should instead resolve the case either using some
form of proportionality review or the burden-focused trump approach
described in this Response.

15 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

I,

50 (1976) (per curiam) ('[N]o test of reasonableness can

save [such] a state law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment." (second alteration

in original) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966))).
16 See William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
107, 114 n.i5 (1982) (collecting cases where Justice Black upheld laws "believed to be unconstitutional . . . even by more conservative colleagues not sharing his 'absolute' commitment to the first
amendment").
17 See Greene, supra note i, at 6o (noting correspondence between trumps and rules).

1

Id. at 76.
19 883 F. 3 d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
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I. BURDEN-BASED TRIGGERS FOR TRUMPS

Greene explains that the rights-as-trumps frame results not only
from preferences for rules over standards, but also from one's understanding of the relevant rights regime.20 In particular, he argues that "a
constitutional court's frame for rights adjudication should fit its paradigm rights cases."121 And despite his general skepticism of the rightsas-trumps frame, he notes that it might be suitable where the paradigm
cases are "pathological" and "courts must defend the very existence of
individual rights against government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption."22
This account sits comfortably with many standard arguments in favor of rules in constitutional rights adjudication. In the words of the
standard-bearer (so to speak) of this view, Justice Black, the absolutist
approach to constitutional rights holds that the purpose of the Bill of
Rights "was to put the freedoms protected there completely out of the
area of any congressional control that may be attempted through the
exercise of precisely those powers that are now being used to 'balance'
the Bill of Rights out of existence."23
It is impossible to give a general account of governmental motive
vis-a-vis constitutional entitlements.24 Even rights that are especially
sensitive to "government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption" - equal
protection and free speech are examples - also deal with many cases
where government purpose is not the sole or even the main issue. The
paradigm cases of government intolerance may be limited to certain doctrinal subcategories such as viewpoint discrimination and racial animus.
Conversely, some rights are not particularly sensitive to government
motive and yet have developed their own trump-like rules. This suggests that the rights-as-trumps frame can be triggered by factors other
than a diagnosis of pathology. Takings is an example. While there is a
nominal motive inquiry in takings cases (that is, the taking must be for
a "public use"), its relaxed enforcement by courts suggests that they are
not particularly concerned with protecting property rights against bigotry, intolerance, or corruption.2 5 (Whether they should be is of course
20 Greene, supra note i, at 35. Because of the appropriately broad sweep
of the Foreword,
Greene's account is largely a general one. See id. at 96-iig (describing "contingent origins" of the
rights-as-trumps frame in U.S. constitutional law).
21 Id. at 127.
22 Id. at 127-28.
23 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (g6o) (Black, J., dissenting); see id. at 61-65.
24 Driven partly by developments in case law, see, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 242021 (2018) (considering the constitutionality of President Trump's proclamation limiting entry to the
United States for nationals of certain countries), recent scholarship has demonstrated a renewed

focus on the relevance of animus. See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION

To BIAS IN THE LAW 65-75, 163-72 (2017); Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Supreme
Court, 20i Term Comment: The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 134-36 (2018).
25 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479-80 (2005).

1124

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

a matter of debate. 2 6 ) Regulatory takings law -

[Vol.

132:120

the basic goal of which

is to determine whether a regulation has gone "too far" 27

-

is usually

governed by the kind of multi-factor balancing test that typifies proportionality review.28
And yet takings doctrine also contains trump-type rules. A permanent
physical occupation of land, for example, constitutes a taking no matter
how minimal and regardless of the government's motivation.29 Or consider
the rule in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,3 0 which treats as a per
se taking anything that denies all economically beneficial uses of land.3 1
The rule in Lucas and others like it trigger the rights-as-trumps
frame based not on government intolerance or bigotry, but on the impact
of a law or regulation. Where that impact constitutes a total deprivation
of some aspect of the right - a "ban," as it were - then courts will
resort to a trump. One sees the same phenomenon in other areas of
constitutional law, including the First Amendment, where the Court has
by its own account "voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose
an entire medium of expression,"132 and in the nascent law of the Second
Amendment, where some judges have identified a per se rule of invalidity
against laws that ban classes of weapons,3 3 or means of carrying them.34
26 See id. at 5o5 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ('Any property may now be taken for the benefit of
another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are
likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms.").
27 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
28 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (I978) (describing an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" that takes into account the "character of the government action,"
the regulation's "economic impact . . . on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," and the nature of the public purposes or interests).
29 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982). I
mean "minimal" in the physical sense - in Loretto, it was a cable and cable box that together
covered about one-eighth of one cubic foot of space atop an apartment building. Id. at 443
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In conceptual terms, the Court saw the intrusion as significant: "[T]he
government does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand." Id. at 435 (majority opinion) (quoting Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 5 1, 65-66 (1979)). Loretto can therefore be understood as a trump driven by the
Court's characterization of the burden on the rights-holder.
30 505 U.S. 103 (1992).
31 Id. at ioig.
32 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 5 (1994); cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 337
(2010) (characterizing restrictions on corporate campaign spending as "an outright ban [on speech
from a particular class of speakers], backed by criminal sanctions," en route to holding that restriction unconstitutional).
33 See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
57o, 628 (2008) (describing D.C.'s prohibition as reaching "an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [a] lawful purpose").
34 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 E 3 d 65o, 666-68 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (striking down D.C.'s
good-cause concealed-carry licensing standard under a "categorical approach" upon finding that
the law denied "the typical citizen" the freedom to carry a gun).
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The justification for applying trumps in these contexts could potentially be explained as a subset of the pathological approach (that is, total
deprivations are proxies for government intolerance), but that is not typically how courts have explained it - they focus on the burden to the
rights-holder, not the motive of the government.3 5 As Greene notes,
Professor Ronald Dworkin's own commitment to the rights-as-trumps
frame arose from his preoccupation with "wholesale denials of citizenship."3 6 And Greene demonstrates that by designing rights to resolve
such extreme warnings, Dworkin also ended up drawing some questionable lines - denying, for example, that racial discrimination against a
white student implicated any constitutional interest whatsoever.3 7
The preceding is meant simply to be descriptive - to show the existence of an alternative road to trumps. But this alternative road also
raises significant complications, some of which it shares with Greene's
approach and some of which are distinct. First, applying rights as
trumps in the context of total deprivations presents basically the inverse
of the scenario that Greene describes, albeit with the same underlying
risk of distorting constitutional principles. Rather than avoiding proportionality by characterizing the constitutional burden as zero, it does
so by characterizing the burden as total. Rather than minimizing valid
constitutional interests, it potentially exaggerates government interference.
Again, Lucas is a prime example. The application of a bright-line
rule in that case did not depend on a conclusion that South Carolina
harbored discriminatory or corrupt intent toward property owners in
general, but that it had denied all economically productive uses to Mr.
Lucas in particular.3" The conclusion was not forward-looking and general, but backward-looking and specific. Lucas's case was in no way
paradigmatic, but the burden he faced was significant enough - total,
according to the (dubious) lower court finding3 9 - that it demanded a
trump in response.
To the dissenters, this was the equivalent of
"launch[ing] a missile to kill a mouse."40

3s See, e.g., Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 55 ('Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech
is readily apparent too much

speech.");

by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress
Eugene

Volokh, Implementing the Right to

Keep and Bear Arms for

Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and aResearch Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1458 (2009)
('[T]he 'entire medium' and 'entire class' formulations should be seen as shorthand proxies for an
inquiry into the functional magnitude of the restriction: whether the measures 'significantly impair
the ability of individuals to communicate their views to others,' or whether they significantly impair

the ability of people to protect themselves." (quoting Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 55 & n.13)).
36 Greene, supra note i, at 32.

37 Id. at 67-68.
38 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 5o5 U.S. 1003, 1Q19 (1992).

39 Id. at 1044-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 1036.
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Greene's Foreword is mostly about the missiles; this Response is
more about the mice - the targets of the rules. And that raises a problem of burden-characterization, which is far more significant for the
kinds of triggers I describe than for Greene's framework. 4 1 To call a
law a "ban," for example, is usually not a result of any particular form
of doctrinal analysis, but rather an ex ante trigger for rule-like doctrines.
Where such a characterization is made - whether the object of the ban
is a medium of expression, a class of arms, or a religious group - a
court is much more likely to employ the rights-as-trump frame. But the
identification of bans is not itself totally governed by rules, nor for that
matter is it clearly governed by text, history, tradition, or even precedent.
Nothing in the First Amendment clearly tells us what a "medium of
expression" is, nor why that should matter.
That is not to say that the problem is insurmountable, nor that law can
provide no guidance. Ever since Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Company v. Mahon4 2 established that government regulation can
sometimes go "too far" and constitute a taking, 43 courts and scholars
have worked to resolve the "denominator" problem, which Professor
Frank Michelman identified in t967 (in the pages of this Review, no
less).44 The Court's most recent pronouncement came just two years
ago in Murr v. Wisconsin,45 which held that, in identifying the parcel
against which a regulation's impact should be measured, judges must
consider "the treatment of the land under state and local law," "the physical characteristics of the land," and "the prospective value of the regulated land." 4 6 Ultimately, the question is "whether reasonable expectations .

.

. would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would

be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts."47 This inquiry
is substantially empirical in the sense that, to adopt Greene's locution,
it "requires reliable access to social facts." 48 For present purposes,
though, what is particularly notable about the Murr test is that it is itself
a multifactor "reasonable expectations" approach that operates as a
predicate to a potential bright-line rule (that is, a finding of total takings).
Although one could illustrate the challenge in virtually any area of
constitutional law, such questions are especially prominent in the context of the Second Amendment. A decade after the Supreme Court's

41
42

l explore this problem more thoroughly in Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
260 U.S. 393 (1922).

43 Id. at 415.
44 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations

of "JustCompensation" Law, S HARV. L. REV. II65,
45 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
46 Id. at 1945.
47 Id.
48 Greene, supra note i,
at 63.
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decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,49 the law and theory of the
right to keep and bear arms are starting to take shape,5 0 even as important questions remain unanswered.5

1

The Second Amendment

therefore provides an extremely useful lens into the development of constitutional doctrine and the characterization of legal burdens.
In the course of striking down the District of Columbia's handgun
regulation, 5 2 Justice Scalia's majority opinion noted that the law prohibited "an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by
American society for [a] lawful purpose,"5 3 and was, largely for that reason, unconstitutional. 5 4 Some judges, including most prominently thenJudge Kavanaugh, have read this to mean that the Second Amendment's
scope should be determined on a categorical basis, as imposing bans on,
for instance, certain categories of weapons 5 5 - a per se rule different in
kind even from strict scrutiny.5 6
In short, there are at least two triggers for the rights-as-trumps
frame: the pathological approach that Greene emphasizes, and a
burden-based analysis exemplified by a finding of "total" deprivation.
There may well be others. But these triggers are not themselves governed by traditional doctrinal machinery or constitutional interpretation. No amount of interpretive work can separate situations in which
the government is exhibiting intolerance and bigotry (thus demanding a
trump) from those in which it is merely incompetent (in which case proportionality might be favored).5
Likewise, labeling a law a "ban" on
some aspect of a right (thus subject to a trump) is not clearly governed
by text, history, tradition, or even precedent.58 Nothing in the First
Amendment tells us what a "medium of expression" is, nor why that

49 554 U.S. 570 (2007).
5o

See generally Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis

of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433 (2018).
51 See generally JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER ioo-i7 (2018).
52 The law was and is generally referred to as a "ban," though illustrating the central challenge of this Response -

it actually was not a complete prohibition.

D.C. Code

§§

7 -2502.oI(b)

(2001) (enumerating exceptions for law enforcement officers, dealers, and others); Heller, 554 U.S. at
575 n.i (dismissing exceptions as irrelevant to the challenge, which involved none of those categories).

53 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 628-29.

5s See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 E 3 d 1244, 1270 (D.C. Cir.
(Kavanaugh,

J., dissenting) ("It follows

2011)

from Heller's protection of semi-automatic handguns that semi-

automatic rifles are also constitutionally protected and that D.C.'s ban on them is unconstitutional.").
56 Id. at 1271 (contrasting a test based on "text, history, and tradition" with a "balancing test

such as strict or intermediate scrutiny"); see also Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837
678, 702-07 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Batchelder,

J.,

E3 d

concurring in most of the judgment); Houston

v. City of New Orleans, 675 E 3 d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting), withdrawn and
superseded on reh'g, 682 F 3 d 361 (5th Cir. 2012).
57 Greene, supra note o, at 127-28.
58 See Blocher, supra note 41.
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should matter. Those determinations can trigger nondiscretionary, categorical rules, but the determinations themselves will almost inevitably
involve the kinds of empirical questions that are more suited to proportionality review.s9
II. THE PATHOLOGICAL SECOND AMENDMENT?

Greene suggests that the choice of the rights-as-trumps frame might
be defensible "where courts must defend the very existence of individual
rights against government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption." 6 0 By contrast, when "the paradigm cases arise from the potential overreach or
clumsiness of a government acting in good faith to solve actual social
problems, rights adjudication must be sensitive to a democratic people's
first-order right to govern itself."6 1

This division of doctrinal labor is attractive. But in many areas, the
debate is less about the descriptive or even normative case for the distinction and more about how it applies to particular rights. The root
disagreement often has more to do with whether particular cases or
rights regimes qualify as paradigmatic or not, and specifically whether
particular cases or regimes are really threatened or not. The division
between rights-as-trumps and proportionality is the terrain for the conflict - the battlefield, rather than the battle.
Again, the Second Amendment is painfully exemplary. On some
prominent accounts, within the right itself - and not just the doctrinal
frame - "rests a darker portrait, a legal Guernica cluttered with slippery slopes, law school hypotheticals, and assorted horribles on parade." 6 2 As Judge Kozinski once remarked in a dissenting opinion: "The
Second Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for those
exceptionally rare circumstances where all other rights have failed ....
However improbable these contingencies may seem today, facing them unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once."6 3 Masterpiece
Cakeshop merely adopted the "polemical" style; 64 Heller was born in it.65

59 Greene, supra note o, at 63.
60 Id. at 127-28.
61 Id. at 128.
62 Id. at 31 (describing the rights-as-trumps frame).

63 Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3 d 567,

57o

(gth Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of

rehearing en banc); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and
Nazi Gun Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars (a Call to Historians), 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
653, 653-59 (2004) (exploring the longstanding argument made by gun rights advocates that gun
control led to the Holocaust).
64 Greene, supra note o, at So.

65 See District of Columbia v. Heller,

554

U.S. 570, 598 (2007) (venerating the idea that "when

the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist
tyranny").
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In the Second Amendment context, then, the dispute is not about
Greene's conclusion that proportionality review is appropriate where the
"paradigm" cases "arise from the potential overreach or clumsiness of a
government acting in good faith to solve actual social problems." 66 Instead, the dispute is about whether the Second Amendment's paradigm
cases fit that mold - whether, in other words, Greene is correct that
'tyranny' is simply not at stake in assessing . . . a measure requiring a
trigger lock on long arms held within the sixty-one square miles of the
nation's capital."67
For some gun rights advocates, disagreement with the latter proposition is fundamental. They believe that, at least when it comes to guns,
"the government is a bad actor and not just a clumsy one," 6 s and that
support for gun regulation is motivated by anti-gun bias. 69 Among the
more extreme, this is something of an article of faith. When the Senate
considered expansion of background checks in the wake of the Newtown
massacre 0 - a proposal that was overwhelmingly popular, even among
gun owners" - National Rifle Association leadership described it as part
of "an anti-gun agenda that seeks to restrict firearm ownership in America
- as much as they can, however they can, and as soon as they can. "12
Justice Scalia gestured in this direction in the dramatic closing lines
of Heller: "Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation,
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where
gun violence is a serious problem. That is perhaps debatable, but what
is not debatable is that it is not the role of this Court to pronounce the
Second Amendment extinct."7 3 The suggestion was that an ominous
"'some" were requesting judicial extinction of the right to keep and bear
arms. Viewed through that lens, the resort to rights-as-trumps makes
sense, even on Greene's account.
Greene's account also sheds new light on the significance of the fact
that some gun rights advocates invoke the constitutional struggle for
racial equality, explicitly comparing Heller to Brown v. Board of
66 Greene, supra note o, at

128.

67 Id. at 91.
68 Id. at 65.
69 See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., THE BIAS AGAINST GUNS: WHY ALMOST EVERYTHING
YOU'VE HEARD ABOUT GUN CONTROL IS WRONG 225-26 (2003).

7o Michael D. Shear, Background Checks Are Still Stumbling Block in Gun Law Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2TzgmQg [https://perma.cc/C7BX-QAAV].
71 See Mark Glaze, Americans, Even NRA Members, Want Gun Reforms, CNN (Feb. 1, 2013,
[https://perma.cc/EZH8AM), http://www.cnn.com/20I3/OI/3I/opinion/glaze-gun-control
7:42

HJ8U] (stating that "74% of NRA members" support background checks).
72 Senate

to Take

Up

Anti-Gun Legislation Soon!,

NRA INST.

FOR

LEGIS.

ACTION

(Apr. 5, 2013), https://www.nraila.org/articles/2013o4o5/senate-to-take-up-anti-gun-legislation-soon

[https://perma.cc/7B87-P5 Qg].
73 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 57o, 636 (2007).
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Education4 and lower courts who reject gun rights claims to the segregationists who engaged in "massive resistance" to Brown.15 As Greene
explains, the turn to rights-as-trumps in American constitutional rights
law was "a way of reconciling the post-Lochner regime of deference to
government actors with the unique place of race in the American constitutional order."7 6 Claiming the mantle of Brown not only ennobles
the struggle for gun rights, but might also be a bid to import the rightsas-trumps frame from equal protection law. At the very least, invoking
Brown helps summon the Elysian notion that judicial review may be
justified where the political process has failed.
This makes it particularly notable that the judiciary is regularly accused of treating the Second Amendment as a "second-class right." 8
Justice Thomas, for example, has repeatedly claimed that the Second
Amendment is being given second-class treatment.7 9
III. NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASS'N

E

CITY OF NEW YORK

What do these arguments portend for the future of gun rights and
regulation? As a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court has given even
less guidance on the Second Amendment than on any of the three areas

74 See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F 223, 224
(2014); David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F 230, 230 (2014).
75 Editorial, Massive Gun Resistance, WALL ST.

J. (Apr.

12, 2013, 6:38 PM) https://www. wsj.

com/articles/SB 0001424127887324600704578402760760473582

[https://perma.cc/HLZ2-CXAA].

Briefs and scholarship have also discussed lower courts' resistance.

See, e.g., Petition for Writ of

Certiorari at 24, Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (No. 15-133); Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014) (No. 13-827); Alice Marie Beard,
Resistance by Inferior Courts to Supreme Court's Second Amendment Decisions, Si TENN. L. REV.
673, 673 (2014).
76 Greene, supra note i, at 35 (footnote omitted).
77 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

75-77 (1980).
78 Ruben & Blocher, supra note 5o, at 1447-50 (providing examples from cases and briefs); see

also George A. Mocsary, A Close Reading of an Excellent Distant Reading of Heller in the Courts,
68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 41, 43 (2018) (concluding that data show "evidence of judicial defiance"
(footnote omitted)); Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Is the Second Amendment a Second-Class
Right?, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 57 (2018) (concluding that there are plausible alternative explanations for the data other than the "second-class" argument).

For a broader argument against the

second-class thesis, see Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a FundamentalRight, HASTINGS
CON. L.Q. (forthcoming 2019).
9 Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) ("The right to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court's constitutional orphan."); Peruta

v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari);
Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2291-92 (2016) (Thomas,
Ct. at 450 (Thomas,

J., dissenting);

Friedman, 136 S.

J.,

dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Transcript of Oral Argument at 3539, Voisine, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (No. 14-10154); see also Josh Blackman, Justice Thomas Speaks Truth to
Power: Second Amendment Is Not a Second-Class Right, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG
(Mar.
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2016),

http://joshblackman.com/blog/2oI6/o3/o/justice-thomas-speaks-truth-to-power-

second-amendment-is-not-a-second-class-right/ [https://perma.cc/M4XK-CQAX].

2019]

RIGHTS AS TRUMPS OF WHAT?

I3I

Greene discusses in the "Forward" section of his Foreword. 0 (Gerrymandering is the closest competitor.) But while this Response was being
prepared for publication, the Court granted certiorari in New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, a challenge to the constitutionality of New York City's licensing scheme limiting the transportation of
locked and unloaded handguns to within city limits."1
The case presents a near-perfect test of the arguments that Greene
makes at length, and which this Response has attempted marginally to
amplify. Picking up the "second-class rights" theme discussed above,
the petitioners have cast their case as one involving the kind of government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption that, in Greene's framework,
demands a trump. Merits briefing has not been scheduled as of this
writing, but even in their reply brief at the certiorari stage, petitioners
argued that "[tihe City betrays [in this law and in the litigation] its hostility to Second Amendment rights."8 2 To the degree that they can convince the Justices that, for example, contemporary gun owners face the
same kinds of political or legal obstacles as black Americans did in the
civil rights era, 3 Heller's "romantic vision of doctrinal simplicity and
coherence"8 4 may present a safe haven, walled off by trumps.
But, speaking broadly, that is a hard argument to take seriously. The
vast majority of Americans support the individual right to keep and
bear arms recognized in Heller.5 The Attorney General and a majority
of Congress (joined by the Vice President) filed briefs in Heller supporting
the right to keep and bear arms for private purposes, as did most state
attorneys general. 6 The decision was rendered in the midst of a presidential election, and both major candidates (Barack Obama and John
McCain) immediately expressed support for its central conclusion.8 7

8 Greene, supra note i, at Ig-31; see also Sanford Levinson, Comment on Ruben and Blocher:
Too Damn Many Cases, and an Absent Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 17, Ig-20 (2018).
81 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, 883 E 3 d 45, 52-54 (2d Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
82 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, N.Y State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, No. 18-280 (NOV. 28, 2018).

83 See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 51, at 187-91 (noting and rejecting this argument).
84 Greene, supra note i, at 56.
85 Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP (Mar. 27,
[https://
perma.cc/8EGA-F7KL].
86 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2007) (No. 07-29o); Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of United States Senate, the President
of the United States Senate, and 250 Members of the United States House of Representatives in
Support of Respondent at 2, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290); Brief of the States of Texas et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Heller, 554 U.S. 57o (No. 07-290) (signed by thirtyone states).
87 See Dina Temple-Raston, Supreme Court: Individuals Have Right to Bear Arms, NPR (June
26, 2008, 10:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=g9igo807
[https://
perma.cc/GgQV-6ALM].
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/io572I/public-believes-americans-right-own-guns.aspx
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These are not the hallmarks of a widespread anti-gun pathology calling
for heightened scrutiny,"" let alone a rights-as-trumps frame.

If instead the Justices see gun regulations as "workaday acts of governance from which individuals seek retail exemption,"^' then the decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol could look quite different.
Greene's account would suggest the application of proportionality review, which would be consistent with the approach overwhelmingly
taken by the federal courts of appeals in gun rights cases.90 The law
might well fail such review, but applying it would permit the Court to
strike down this outlier law without disturbing the broad, settled doctrinal consensus in the lower courts - a result of precisely the kind of
case-by-case doctrinal development that Heller invited those courts to
perform.
The approach described here highlights a different possible resolution, however: per se invalidation of New York's law on the basis that
it goes "too far." This would be the equivalent of Heller's holding that
a citywide ban on handguns the "quintessential self-defense
weapon" - is per se unconstitutional in light of the amendment's "core"
interest of self-defense. 91 As in Heller, the Court could avoid having to
credit an allegation of bias on the part of city officials, who, after all,
undoubtedly believe themselves to be saving lives and preventing harm.
Such a narrow, bright-line rule would become part of the Second
Amendment's doctrinal machinery without displacing the overwhelming use of means-end scrutiny to evaluate regulations that impose less
of a burden on the right's core interests - just as Lucas exists alongside
the default multi-factor balancing approach in regulatory takings.
Or perhaps the Court will take another route by opening the door
more broadly to as-applied challenges. Although Greene does not discuss as-applied challenges in detail, greater reliance on them may provide a middle way between absolutism and proportionality - a way for
courts to provide "retail exemption[s]1"92 without characterizing a rule as

88 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term - Comment: Second Amendment
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, I22 HARV. L. REV. 246, 260 (2008) ('There is no special reason
for an aggressive judicial role in protecting against gun control, in light of the fact that opponents
of such control have considerable political power and do not seem to be at a systematic disadvantage
in the democratic process."); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 303 (2009).
89 Greene, supra note i, at 32.
90 See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3 d
185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) ('A two-step inquiry has emerged as the prevailing approach. . . ."); see also
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 E 3 d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 20I5) (noting that the two-part
test had been largely adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh,
and D.C. Circuits).
91 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629-30.
92 Greene, supra note i, at 32.
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facially unconstitutional. To employ one of the Chief Justice's metaphors,9 3 as-applied challenges recognize that different batters have different strike zones.
In fact, as-applied challenges are among the most significant issues
in Second Amendment litigation today, as some courts have begun to
permit them against broad federal prohibitions on gun possession. The
Third Circuit did so as applied to challengers with old state misdemeanors on their records. 9 4 The Sixth Circuit did so as applied to a challenger
with a decades-old involuntary commitment for mental illness.95 Such
as-applied challenges raise difficult questions about court capacity and
line-drawing, to be sure, but they also better fit the needs of "constitutional adjudication in a mature democracy whose citizens experience
themselves as rights-bearers but who nonetheless must cohabit a working ecosystem."'

6

No right behaves like a trump all the time. Nearly all of them do
sometimes. When and why they do so is the underlying challenge presented by Greene's Foreword: to identify the triggers for the rights-astrumps frame, not simply in general terms, but in the contexts of particular cases and particular rights regimes.

9

ChiefJustice Roberts Statement -

Nomination Process, U.S. COURTS, https://www. uscourts.

gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/chief-justice-roberts-statement-nomination-process

[https://perma.cc/E63D-AYTG].
94 Binderup v. Atty Gen., 836 E 3 d 336, 340, 345-47 (3 d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
95 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 E 3 d 678, 681, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
96 Greene, supra note i, at 131.
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